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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE P. CAMPBELL,

)

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

)
)

vs.

)

PEARL STAGG,
Defendant and
Appellant.

Case No. 15912

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brings this action against defendant to
recover for personal injury.
Defendant claims that plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant's insurance company to settle plaintiff's
claim and the contract is a bar to plaintiff's action.
Plaintiff claims that the contract was void or voidable
because of a mutual mistake of fact between plaintiff and Lavell
Brown, agent for State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
Defendant claims that her insurance company was State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and that her insurance
company is an indispensable party to this action.
Defendant claims the facts surrounding the execution
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T
of the instrument do not amount to a mutual mistake of fact

I
1.

Defendant claims that plaintiff, after signing the
contract, by his conduct, further ratified the contract and
should be estopped to deny its validity.

I

I
I

Defendant claims that the court erred in its application of Section 78-27-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, allowing
interest on special damages retroactively.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a money judgment against
defendant although it failed to cancel the contract between
plaintiff and defendant's insurance company.
The lower court in its findings determined that
interest was due on special damages from the date of the injury,
September 9, 1973, until March 10, 1978, in accordance with
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-27-44.
The court, in its conclusions, :=;tated that State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was not a necessary party
to the action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
AS TO PLEADINGS :
Plaintiff's complaint was for damages for personal
injury. R 3-4.

974
The summons was dated the 20th of February, 1 •

and served the 23rd of February, 1974.
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.
I

On March 15, 1974, defendant answered and as an
affirmative defense plead that the contract entered into
between plaintiff and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company was a bar to plaintiff's action.

R-6

On the 29th of March, 1976, the court ordered,
"that the plaintiff file an amendment to his complaint to
plead the fact of the 'Agreement and Release' signed by the
plaintiff and LaVell Brown on September 21, 1973--------said
amendment is to reflect plaintiff's position as to said
and Release'--------".

R-54

~greement

In compliance with the court order,

plaintiff amended his complaint by adding paragraph 7 and 8 that
read:

R-52
7.
That an "Agreement and Release" was signed by
the plaintiff on September 21, 1973, a copy of which
is attached hereto and made a part of this Complaint
as if fully set forth. Said Agreement was VOID or
VOIDABLE by reason that there was a mutual mistake of
fact between the plaintiff and LaVell Brown, agent for
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, as to the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff on the 9th day of September,
1973. That the plaintiff in fact suffered certain
injuries to his neck and spine and other areas of his
body which were unknown to him or Lavell Brown at the
time said "Agreement and Release" was signed.
8.
That the plaintiff has properly and effectively
voided said "Agreement and Release", and that said
"Agreement and Release" is not a bar to his recovery
in this action.
By leave of court, defendant amended her answer to

plead; (1) release, (2) that the contract between plaintiff and
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company amounted to a bar
to the action; (3) that plaintiff had ratified the contract of
September 21, 1973; and (4) further that he was estopped to deny
- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-..,
I

i
I
the contract.

R- 92 and 93

AS TO OBJECTION TO TRIAL UNTIL THE INDISPENSABLE PARTY WAS
JOINED.
Before the conunencement of the trial, on October 3,
1977, defendant's counsel informed the court that, in his opinion·
the court could not proceed with the trial until the proper par-'/
ties were named in the pleadings.

Minute Entry dated October 31

1977, found seven pages after R-536.
I

Written objection to the trial for the reason that
was an indispensable party was filed January 18, 1978.

t~~j

R-220

AS TO EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT.
On September 21, 1973, Lavell Brown, agent for State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Eugene P. Campbell
met in Helper, Utah for the purpose of settling Mr. Campbell's
claim against Pearl Stagg.
LaVell Brown proposed a settlement of the entire
matter for a sum of either $1600 or $1800 on a release basis.
Tr-155, lines 12-25.
Mr. Campbell refused to settle on a complete release
because as Mr. Campbell said, ''When he gave me the document to
sign the first one, it completely released them of any liabilitY
of any type to me.

And I refused that.

next one, Exhibit 28, I read it over.
over.

When he gave me the
He helped me read it

And I decided that because I had already been to Dr.

Gorishek, they still hadn't determined what was wrong with~'

- 4 -
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I
I

I

whether it was going to be for a short period or a long period-then I decided I would go ahead and sign that one covering any
expenses for the next couple of months".

Tr 127-128

At the time the Agreement and Release was signed, Mr.
Campbell understood State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had agreed to pay medical expenses as set forth in the document and to pay $72 per day as more fully set forth in the document.

Tr-158

This was important to Mr. Campbell when he signed

the document because of the payment of future medical bills and
wages.

Tr-159
Mr. Campbell did not attempt to contact Mrs. Stagg at

any time.

Tr-153.

Mr. Campbell was of the opinion that his busi-

ness was with the insurance company, not Mrs. Stagg.

Tr-153.

At the time of the signing of the Agreement and Release,
on September 21, 1973, Mr. Brown's impression, as shown by his
report of September 21, 1973, as to Mr. Campbell's condition was,
"bruises and cervical sprain".

Tr-84

Mr. Brown's definition of

a cervical sprain is, "I believe a cervical sprain to be a stretching of the neck muscles causing a pain--trauma to the neck". Tr-85.

Mr. Brown recorded in his Filing Sheet, Bodily Injury Claims,
"Coverage A & B closed, payment on open release.
medical bills.

To be paid when received.

plus steering column and tire.

I did not have

Low estimate $771.39

I allowed $850.00.

When I left

for Price last night I thought I would be able to settle on Blue
Release.

Claimant is still under Doctor's care with neck and back

so I negotiated an open release".

Exhibit 29

- 5 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Brown said at trial, "Because he (Mr. Campbell)
wasn't sure about his neck or injuries or what he might have.
So we then discussed and worked out the settlement that we d~
on the other release, which we referred to it as an open relea 1l
because it leaves the medical coverage open and the loss of wagi:
open within a specified limit".

Tr-87

MR. CAMPBELL KEPT A COPY OF THE CONTRACT UNTIL HE TOOK IT TO RH
ATTORNEY IN DECEMBER, 1973.
Eugene P. Campbell was given a copy of the Agreement a:
Release after it was signed on September 21, 1973.

Mr. Campbell

kept the Agreement and Release in his possession until December
of 1973, when he took it to his Attorney, Jackson Howard.

Tr·l):

AFTER SEPTEMBER 21, 19 7 3 , MR. CAMPBELL CONTINUED TO ASK FOR THE
BENEFITS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONfRACT AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY
KEPT PAYING.
Mr. Campbell had not cashed the Draft given to him on
September 21, 1973, by Mr. Brown, at the time he went to Dr. Gor·1
ishek on September 26, 1973.
On September 30, 1973, Mr. Campbell wrote to Mr. Brown
as follows:
I would like to let you know what has transpired
this past week.
The check you gave me on 9-21-73 as you know,
had to be cleared thru another bank, causing me lost
time and great embarrassment.
I was to buy a car from a fellow worker on Wed.
9-26-73. We both left work at 1:00 p.m. on 9-26-73,

- 6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and met at the Walker Bank in Price. As you know
what would happen, they could not cash the check
and I could not buy the car.
Now this has left me afoot for an additional
seven to ten days while the check clears, plus the
work hours lost on the job .
. I don't want to thank you for all this inconvenience but I do expect prompt compensation for my
loss two hours @ $9.00 per hour.
.
On the ~ame day 9-26-73, I had an appointment
with Dr. Gorishek. Lost hours for this appointment
amounted to one (1) hour of straight time pay @ $9.00
per hour plus two (2) hours of double time pay@ $16.50
per hour.
I also had to buy another prescription@ $4.55
from Kelley's Drug Store.
I feel I should also be compensated for an additional six days without a car at $8.00 a day = $48.00.
This grand total comes to $112.55 that I feel
State Farm Ins. Co. can pay.
You can send me a check, one I can cash, or stop
by my apartment.
Signed, Eugene P. Campbell

Ex. 57

The draft given to Mr. Campbell by Mr. Brown on September 21, 1973, was sent for collection by Walker Bank and Trust
Company, Price, Utah, and not paid by The Greeley National Bank,
Greeley, Colorado, until October 1, 1973.

Exhibit 56.

Mr. Campbell continued to go to doctors in connection
with his neck injury and ran up medical bills which he would submit to the insurance company.
64, 65, 66, 67, and 68.

Exhibits 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,

As late as December 3, 1973, Mr. Campbell

verified his wage loss and wrote Mr. Brown.

Exhibit 60

After the original draft was negotiated, Eugene P. Camp- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

bell received, endorsed and negotiated drafts as follows:
Draft #449 101 Q, dated 10/15/73 in the amount of $20.0Q
Draft #449 102 Q, dated 10/15/73 in the amount of $13.SO
Draft #449 112 Q, dated 10/29/73 in the amount of $4.35
Draft #435 367 Q, dated 12/13/73 in the amount of $19.00
Draft #449 178 Q, dated 12/31/73 in the amount of $20.00
Draft #449 188 Q, dated 1/12/74 in the amount of $74.SO
Draft #449 244 Q, dated 2/5/74 in the amount of $33.50
Draft #449 245 Q, dated 2/5/74 in the amount of $25.00
Draft #457 960 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $147.00
Draft #457 961 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $78.00
Draft #457 962 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $49.00
Draft :/t457 963 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $1349.70
Draft #457 964 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $13.53
Draft #457 965 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of

$1027.~

AS TO MR. CAMPBELL'S MEDICAL CONDITION.
September 9, 1973
At 2:45 p.m. on September 9, 1973, plaintiff, Eugene
P. Campbell, presented himself to the Outpatient and Emergency
Service of the Carbon Hospital for medical attention.
Dr. William Gorishek was called to give medical atten·
tion to plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell.

Plaintiff, Eugene P.

Campbell, gave Dr. Gorishek a medical history on September 9,
1973, of having been involved in an automobile accident and as
a result suffered pain in his neck, headache, swelling of the
right elbow and left knee.

Exhibit 39.
- 8 -

Tr-16.
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t

Dr. Gorishek, on September 9, 1973, examined the
person of Eugene P. Campbell and ordered x-rays of parts of
Mr. Campbell's body.

Tr-23

The clinical examination showed

spasm in the tissues of the neck, Tr-33, and limitation of
motion in all directions, to-wit:

lateral, rotation, flexion,

extension, Tr-34, and soreness and stiffness in his neck. Tr-41
The x-ray of the neck and thoracic spine showed:
"The patient shows straightening in the neck region.
Arthritic changes are apparent, with both anterior
and some posterior spurring. T-7 is wedged, though
the characteristics of this is a remote change. No
other possible acute wedge fractures are identified.
There is somewhat more arthritic change in the thoracic
spine than expected in a 42 year old man.
Both thoracic and cervical spines show more arthritic
changes than expected. There is posterior spurring
of significant degree in the cervical region with moderately advanced arthritic changes at several levels.
T-7 is wedged, but this appears to be old most likely."
Exhibit 39
After examining Mr. Campbell, Dr. Gorishek, on September
9, 1973, reached a diagnosis of Mr. Campbell's condition of a
cervical strain.

Exhibit 39

Or. Gorishek's definition of a

cervical strain is ''excessive stretching or over exertion of the
muscles and other soft tissue in the cervical area".
14-17.
!

Tr-39, lines

Soft tissues in the cervical area consist of muscles, Tr-24;

ligaments, Tr-25; veins, Tr-26; arteries, Tr-27; nerves, Tr-28;
nerve root, Tr-30; and cervical discs, Tr-32.
On September 9, 1973, Or. Gorishek told Mr. Campbell,
"He had a soft tissue injury and probably a strain that would
eventually clear up by itself, at least with treatment.

If

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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symptoms persisted and became worse, then further studies were
indicated."

Tr-19, lines 7-10.

Dr. Gorishek on September 9, 1973, prescribed a
muscle relaxant and pain medication for Mr. Campbell and
advised him in addition to taking the prescription drugs, to
apply heat to his neck as well as massaging the muscle.

Tr-17,

lines 6-8.
On September 9, 1973, Dr. Gorishek believed Mr. Camp·,
bell's condition to more or less of a minor nature.

Tr-17,

lines 17-19.
On September 9, 1973, Mr. Campbell's neck was mostly
sore on the left side.
On September 9, 1973, Dr. Gorishek believed that the
muscles and ligaments of Mr. Campbell's neck were injured.

Tr·11

On September 9, 1973, there was no way at that point
to determine the extent of the damage to his nerves.
Compression of a nerve root may cause pain.

Tr-28

Pressure on a nerve

regardless of the location, may cause pain through the various
fiber tracts within the nerve itself.

Tr-29

Pain which is

caused by irritation of the nerve roots is always accompanied hi
muscle spasm.

Tr-34

The x-rays that were taken at the hospital on Septembe
9, 1973, showed a straightening of the curve in the neck.

Tr·ll
!

Dr. Gorishek stated in regard to this condition, ''With the stra·!
ightening of the cervical neck, a portion of the neck, it means'
that the muscles are guarding and tending to straighten out the
- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cervical spine from its usual normal curvature."

Tr-35

The x-rays of September 9, 1973, showed the anterior
spurring in the cervical area.

Tr-35.

This was significant to

or. Gorishek because the spurring--even in a slight trauma,
could force back against the nerve roots and cause pain and
discomfort.

Tr-36.

As of September 9, 1973, the pain in Mr. Campbell's
neck could have been caused by a cervical disc being pooched
out a little.

Tr-42.

September 19, 1973
Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on September 19,
1973.

The symptoms and signs were the same including the sore-

ness on the left side.

Tr-44.

On September 19, 1973, Dr. Gorishek prescribed a
cervical collar.

The purpose of the cervical collar was to

support the structure of the neck, to splint the neck, to splint
and immobilize the neck.

Tr-45.

Dr. Gorishek stated upon questioning that he, Dr.
Gorishek, knew that Mr. Campbell had an injury to his neck but
the consequences of the injury turned out worse than he originally thought.

To put it another way, Dr. Gorishek said he knew

that Mr. Campbell had an injury to his neck but the exact nature
of the injury was unknown.

Tr-59-60.

Eugene P. Campbell admits at the time that Dr. Gorishek
prescribed the neck collar, September 19, 1973, he was having
considerable pain and discomfort with his neck.

Tr-143.

Mr.

- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Campbell took off a half a day's work on the 19th of September,
1973, to go see Dr. Gorishek because he was having difficult y,
Tr-144.
September 26, 1973
Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on September 26
1973.

The symptoms and signs were the same.

'

Tr-46.

On September 26, 1973, Dr. Gorishek further treated
Mr. Campbell by the injection of Xylocaine, a local anesthetic
to relieve pain, and Indicin, a medication used to relieve pab
produced by arthritis.

Tr-46-47.

By September 26, 1973, Dr. Gorishek suspected that Mr.
I

Campbell's pain and discomfort was arthritis aggravated by traui;
Tr-47-48.
October 30, 1973
Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on October 30, 191J.
Mr. Campbell still had the same symptoms of pain, discomfort and
soreness in his neck.

Tr-49.

November 13, 1973
On November 13, 1973, Mr. Campbell's symptoms and sig~'
were exactly the same except Mr. Campbell was having some left
arm soreness.

Tr-49.

December 7, 1973
On December 7, 1973, Dr. Gorishek made a diagnosis of
possible advanced arthritis with nerve root irritation.

Tr-SO.!

It was Dr. Gorishek's opinion that the pathogenic condition of
Mr. Campbell's neck was undoubtedly the same September 9, 1973,
- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as it was December 7, 1973.

Tr-50.

Pathogenic being defined by

Dr. Gorishek as "the cause of the illness or symptom".

Tr-51.

December 19, 1973
After Dr. William Gorishek treated Mr. Campbell, he
was treated by Dr. Robert H. Lamb.

Dr. Lamb had Mr. Campbell

admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital on December 19, 1973.

On

December 19, 1973, Mr. Campbell gave a medical history to Dr.
Lamb as follows:
"The patient was involved in an accident 3i
years ago when he fell two stories injuring his
back and neck. The patient has had the onset of
sensation in the left hand in the ulnar nerve distribution and more recently in the median nerve
distribution. The patient also describes a sensation of a vague pain under the left shoulder on
the left which radiates down the lateral aspect of
the arm. The patient denies any weakness.: Exh. 40
Mr. Campbell was seen in consultation by Dr. Thoen,
who felt he had a herniated cervical disc and suggested initial
conservative therapy.
On the hospitalization commencing December 19, 1973,
Mr. Campbell gave Dr. Thoen the following history:
"This 42 year old man was admitted because of
pain in the neck and the left arm since several months
ago when he was involved in an automobile accident.
He was severely shaken up by the injury. His neck has
been stiff and aching ever since. He has had pain running into the left shoulder and down the left arm into
the 3rd 4th and 5th digits of the left hand but more
common in the 3rd and 4th. It is accentuated by certain
movements of the head and neck but not by coughing or
sneezing."
A cervical myelogram was performed and revealed some
lack of filling of the left nerve root pouch of CS-6 with a transverse ridge like filling defect across the CS-6 interspace. The
- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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>
l

patient was treated conservatively and gradually responded.

Ex ..

Mr. Campbell was discharged January 4, 1974, with a
final diagnosis of cervical disc syndrome.
September 2-11, 1974
Mr. Campbell continued to have problems involving his
neck and was therefore admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital on
September 2, 1974 and discharged September 11, 1974, Exhibit 41,
for the purpose of an operation known as an anterior C5-6 disc
and fusion.

Prior to the operation the diagnostic aid of a cer·

vical myelogram was used which showed:
"The C-5/6 ventral and central defect is associati
with osteophyte indentation at the C-5/6 level. The c.i
5/6 joint space is narrowed. The root sleeves are pre·
served in all cervical levels."
The radiologist, Richard R. Flynn, M.D. had the follow·
ing impression:
"Cervical ventral column defect is located at the I
C-5/6 level following the contour of posterior spurs.
In retrospect, the myelogram study of 12-22-73 wasp~
dominantly subdural accounting for the peculiar cervic1:
appearance, observed at this study."
Report of myelogram, Exhibit 41.
It is the opinion of Dr. Thoen that "any herniated dist
I

thoracic outlet syndrome that may result from a hyper extension I
I

injury would initially present itself as a cervical strain and

I

would be almost impossible to distinguish one from the other un· •
less one were a neurologist and examined the patient."

- 14 -
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Tr-189.

--ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY IS A
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS ACTION,
Eugene P. Campbell, plaintiff, admits that he settled
his claim for personal injury and property damage

against the

defendant, Pearl Stagg, by entering into a contract with defendant's
insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
Plaintiff claims there was a mutual mistake of fact between the
insurance company's agent and plaintiff, as to the nature and
extent of his injuries.

Plaintiff, in his complaint, states plain-

tiff has properly and effectively voided said "Agreement and Release."

R-52.

Plaintiff's final Amended Complaint has no reference whatso-

ever to the contract between plaintiff and defendant's insurance
company. R-109.
To rescind a contract the trial court, of necessity, would
apply equitable principles.

To rescind a contract all parties inter-

ested in the contract must be joined.

State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, as the insurer of defendant, has an interest
and is one contracting party of the contract that would have to
be

set aside.
"A court cannot adjudicate directly upon the rights
of a person without having him either actually or
constructively before it. As a general rule, ~here
can be no binding adjudication of a per~on's r7gh~s
in the absence of that person, ... Accordingly, ~t 7s
a general rule that e~ery pers~n whose rig~t~ it is
sought to adjudicate in an action must be Joined
therein...
.
· t
Although one party has brought an action aga7ns
.
another if there is a failure to join therein certain
other p~rties, the court will not, or, ~s.som~ courts
have stated, cannot, proceed with the litigation or

- 15 -
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proceed to a final decision, and hence such erso
are designated "indispensable" or "necessaryf. par~~e•
although some courts use the term "necessary" in a '•
sense less absolute than that in which they use th
term, "indispensable".
e
The burden of procuring the presence of all such
indispensable parties is on the plaintiff." Parties

59 Am Jur 2d 483-484, Sec. 96.
"It frequently is said that persons who are indispens·
parties and must be joined as parties of record are r'. 1
whos~ interests are such that no final decree be~e~!
parties before the court which would do justice betwel
them can be made without leaving the controversy in sr
a situation that its final determination may be whon,
inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Partii

59 Am Jur 2d 487, Sec. 96.
"The rules of equity with reference to parties controli
in a suit wherein plaintiff seeks to enforce equit~h
rights through the equitable remedy of cancellatioom
rescission. All persons whose rights, interests, or
relations with or through the subject matter of the
suit would be affected by the cancellation or rescissi:i,
are proper and necessary parties in order that they•
have an opportunity to be heard; and unless they are
made parties the court is precluded from rendering a I
judgment or decree of cancellation. Where such persor,;
are not made parties originally, they may be brought
in by amendment; but until the omission is corrected
the court should not proceed further, even though no
objection is made by any party litigant." Cancellatio:i
of Instruments, 12 C.J.S. Sec. 52, 1027-1028.
A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
for the December Term 1854, Shields vs. Barrow, 17 H, 411,
the general rule.

annour~

There are

·I

"three classes of parties to a bill in equity. They
are:
1. Formal parties.
2. Persons having an in~e:es'
• n the controversy
and who ought to be made partte ' \
1.
'
· he~W
re·
in order that the court
may act on that rule wh ic
quires it to decide on, and finally determine t~e 8 ll
controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting lv
the rights involved in it. These persons are coffi!IlOO'
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termed necessary parties; but if their interests are
separable from those of the parties before the court
so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do
'
complete and final justice, without affecting other
persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties. 3. Persons who not only have
an interest in the controversy, but an interest of
such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that int~rest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination
may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
A bill to rescind a contract affords an example of
this kind. For, if only a part of those interested
in the contract are before the court, a decree of
rescission must either destroy the rights of those
who are absent, or leave the contract in full force
as respects them; while it is set aside, and the
contracting parties restored to their former condition, as to the others. We do not say that no case
can arise in which this may be done; but it must be
a case in which the rights of those before the court
are completely separable from the rights of those
absent, otherwise the latter are indispensable parties."
Utah follows the general rule announced in the Shields

vs. Barrow case, supra.
Our Utah Court in the case of Houser vs. Smith et al.
19 Utah 150; 56 P. 683 ( 1899) stat es:
"Courts have no right to dispose of and adjudicate
upon property rights of persons not parties to the
case and strangers to the record, and a judgment
rendered against persons not parties to the action,
and over whom the court acquired no jurisdiction,
is absolutely void as to them."
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had a
contract right in its settlement agreement with plaintiff and the
court should not adjudicate upon this property right without having
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company before it.
In the Utah case of South Kamas Irrigation Company vs.
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Provo River Water Users' Association, 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P.2d
851 (1960) the plaintiff attempted to have an adjudication of
its right to use a tunnel.

The plaintiff recognized that such

a judgment in and of itself would not be sufficient to require
the defendant to allow the use of its tunnel in the absence of
consent of the United States.

The United States would not consc:

to be named as a party in the action.

The court said in view

the fact that the judgment which the plaintiff seeks

0;

against~

defendant cannot be enforced against it without enforcing it
against the United States, the United States is an indispensablE
party to this action and its sovereign immunity should be upheli
Plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell, could not enforce

a~

rights that he obtained against Pearl Stagg without effecting
the rights of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
Certainly State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is an
indispensable party to this action.
Our Utah Court speaking on necessary parties in the
case of Stone vs. Salt Lake City, et al. 11 Utah 2d 196; 356 p,1c(
631 (1960) states:
"One should be regarded as a necessary party to a
lawsuit if he has rights or interests involved in
the subject matter in such a way tha~ his presence
is essential to a full, fair and equitable det:rrnination of his rights and those of other parties
to the suit, and necessary pa:tie~ inc~ude the
. 'ti·
in
which
the
val~l.
g rantees of a deed > in an action
II
of such deed is under attack.
\

Another Utah Case handling the matter of an indispensa,
party puts i· t sornew h a t d"i fferently ·

In the case of State ~
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Mutual Insurance Company vs. Jack B. Holt, 531 P.2d 495 (1975)
state Farm Mutual Insurance Company brought an action for a
declaratory judgment against the person it contracted the insurance with, a person to whom the insured vehicle had been sold
and persons who had been injured by the insured vehicle.

The

supreme Court held that there was coverage on the automobile in
question.

The injured persons showing to the trial court that

their injury was much greater than the coverage, made a motion
to split up the twenty thousand dollar coverage.

The tort feasor,

or the person driving the insured vehicle, although named in the
lawsuit, was never served.

The court answered the claims of the

injured persons by stating that the tort feasor had a right to be
heard before the judgment could be found against him.

The court

pointed out that if the injured persons wanted money from the
insurance company they must either accept settlement with the
insurance company or sue the tort feasor.
In this case, Eugene P. Campbell, plaintiff has accepted
i

1cl

an offer from the insurance company and entered into a written

I

contract, but in plaintiff's action to set aside the contract
fails to join the insurance company.
California, in Bank of California Nat. Ass'n. et al v.
~perior

v.I

I

o.j

Court in and for City and County of San Francisco et al.,

106 P.2d 879 (1940) addressing itself to indispensable parties who
want affirmative relief, such as the cancellation of an instrument,
states:
"Where plaintiff seeks some type of affirmative relief
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which, ~f granted, would injure or affect the int
of a third person not joined the third person . eresti
"indispensable party".
'
is an
A court which attempts to proceed in an action whe
indispensable parties are not before the court actn
beyond its jurisdiction and may be res trained by s
prohibition."
POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE
RELEASE AS TO STATE FARM MUTIJAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
OPERATES TO DISCHARGE AND RELEASE THE DEFENDANT FROM ANY LIABILITY IN THE PRESENT ACTION.
Recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court have held
that a release is broad enough to bar recovery not only by the
parties to the contractural release, but also by parties excludeo
from the express language of the release contract.
In Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d

109; 493 P.2d 625 (1972) it states:
"Action against corporation alleging that its employee,
while operating motor vehicle within scope of his emplo!
ment, negligently collided with plaintiff's vehicle,
causing plaintiff injuries and property loss, where~
defendant moved for summary judgment on ground that
plaintiff's covenant not to sue employee operated as
matter of law to release defendant from liability and,
prior to hearing on motion, plaintiff filed action
against employee and his carrier for reformation of
covenant not to sue. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, Joseph E. Nelson J., granted decree o~ refor·
mat ion, denied defendant 1s motion for summary Judgment
and granted defendant's petition for intermediate appea
The Supreme Court held that where covenant not to s~
specified that inJured plaintiff understood that ~gre:i
ment was to terminate further controversy respect1ngh t
claims for damages which plaintiff had asserted or t 8
he or his personal representatives might thereafter
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as~ert

against negligent employee, the covenant constituted a complete exoneration of employee and removed any foundation upon which to impute negligence
to employer, whose liability was derivative and secondary, and plaintiff was not entitled to maintain
action against employer."
A year later in Williams v. Green 29 Utah 2d 141; 506
P.2d 64 (1973) the court extended the protection of a release
to a doctor who was not a party to the release contract.

The

plaintiff suffered an injury while at work for an oil company and
the defendant doctor treated his injuries.

Subsequently the

plaintiff negotiated and settled his claim against his employer
by executing a release with the employer for all damages which
may develop in the future as a result of the injury.

Two years

after the injury the plaintiff attempted to bring this action
against the doctor claiming damages for the same injuries he had
previously settled with the employer.

The court held as a matter

of law (by sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment)
that the plaintiff could not maintain his cause of action against
the defendant doctor on the bare assertion that the release was
not intended to include the claim against the doctor.
Finally, in 1974, the Utah Supreme Court announced
their decision in Catmull v. Medical Integrated Systems, Inc.
30 Utah 2d 334; 517 P.2d 1023.

This case came to the Supreme

Court on appeal from the trial court's granting of sunnnary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Plaintiff's child had been swim-

ming at the Hygeia Ice company pool in Sugarhouse and was found
lying at the bottom of the pool.

The lifeguards gave the child
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mouth-to-mouth resuscitation until the defendant's ambulance
arrived.

The controverted fact was whether or not the child

was revived or dead at the time the ambulance arrived.

The

evidence is uncontroverted however, that the child was dead on
arrival at the hospital.

Plaintiffs, through negotiations by

their attorney, entered into a release contract with the Hygeia
Ice Company releasing and forever discharging the said Hygeia
Ice Company of and from any and all claims, foreseen and unfore,,

and the consequences thereof.
In this action against the Ambulance company the plai::I
i

claim that the release executed with the Hygeia Ice Company ran I
only to that company.

In answer to this allegation the Supreme]

Court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judg·]
ment for the defendant by holding that:
"Inasmuch as it appears that the plaintiffs had
accepted the settlement and released their claim
for their loss from the death of their son, the
trial court was justified in his determination
that there remained to them no further cause of
action on which to maintain this suit against the
defendant ambulance company."
The three Utah cases cited above apply to the factual
:

situation at hand only by analogy.

In each of the cases mention<JI

the court, as a matter of law, allows the release contract to

'

extend to parties that are not involved in the written instrument
and bars recovery by the release against sue h par ti es.

The court

released the employer because of the release affecting the

e~~
ni'

the doctor discharged because of the release to the employer, a ,
;abil.; ty because of ti
the ambulance company was exonerate d from l
L

L
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I

I

i

release of the swimming pool owner.
In the case at hand the connection between the released party, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
and the defendant is much closer--the defendant is a party to
the contract.

As long as the release remains valid as to State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the defendant is also
released as to liability because the release cannot be set aside
until all parties thereto are brought into the action.

Three

distinct factors illustrate the close connectedness between the
party released and the defendant:
A.

The Release Contract - The plaintiff, defendant,
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
are all parties to the release contract and the
release as to one constitutes a release as to all.
Exhibit 28

B.

Insurance Contract - The first paragraph of Section
I of the insurance contract between the defendant
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
expressly gives State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company the right to negotiate and settle the
plaintiff's claim and as a result of the execution
of the release State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
thereCompany became a direct party to the release,
valid as to the
fore, as long as the release remains
as
insurance company it remains valid and effective
to the defendant.

Exhibit 81
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C.

Plaintiff's Negotiations - Plaintiff's affirmative steps to negotiate with the absent insurance company and to settle with them as a party '
to the contract clearly show that the release is
valid as to the insurance company.

Tr 158-159

Exhibits 34 and 35
Defendant claims that since the release of the employe:
supported release of the employer, release of the company allOlleil
release of the doctor and release of the swimming pool owner wai

i

a sufficient release of the ambulance company then a fortiori
release of the insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company,must constitute release of the insured defendant.
The Constitution of Utah, Article I Sec. 7, provides
as follows:
·~o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."

The comparable section of the Constitution of the
United States of America is Amendment XIV Sec. 1 provides as
follows:
''Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
The contract right with plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell, .
I

as to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company would be

I

I

I

a property right.
Bonnev ille ]rl:
P
The Utah Court in t h e case o f .=....::a~r~r~y~v~·_!::..::.:.:=:-'-"'~~~

I

Dist. et al, 263 P. 751 (1928) states:
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j

"It is of course an elementary rule of law that there
~an be no judicial action affecting vested rights that
:s not based up~n some process or notice whereby the
interes~ed_p~rties_are brought within the jurisdiction
of the Judicial tribunal about to render judgment."
It would be difficult to see how the right could be
extinguished as to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
without the court having jurisdiction of the company.
Other Utah cases have dealt with this subject.

The

case of Naisbitt v. Herrick et al, 290 P. 950 (1930) states:
"'Due process' requires that judgment affecting property
be based on service of process calculated to give notice."
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Industrial Commission
of Utah et al, 279 P. 612 (1929) states it:
"Notice and an opportunity to be heard are elementary
requirements of due process of law, when the rights
of a party are to be affected by judicial proceeding."
The cancellation of the contract as to State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company without obtaining jurisdiction of
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company would be void as
being unconstitutional.
The Texas court, in a 1955 case, held that the insurance
company had a vested right in the contract of release of the
insured even though the release was an absolute release and the
insurance company was not named in the instrument as a contracting party.

Pattison v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, 278 S.W.

2d 207.
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POINT III
THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFF AND LaVELL BROWN, AGENT FOR THE INSURANCE COMPANY,
AS TO THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF SUFFERED AN INJURY TO HIS NECK
AND SPINE.
AS TO THE PLEADINGS:
Rule 8 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2)
a demand for judgment for the relief to which he
deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative
or of several different types may be demanded."
Rule 9 (b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be sue~
with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally."
Our Utah court in the case of Heathman v. Hatch, 13
Utah 2d 266; 372 P.2d 990 (1962) states:
"The basic facts must be set forth with sufficient
particularity to show what facts are claimed to
constitute such charges."
The court also states:
"The objective of these rules is to require that
the essential facts upon which redress is sought
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be set fo:th with simplicity, brevity, clarity
and certainty so that it can be determined whether
there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed·
and, if.so, so tha7 there will be a clearly defin~d
foundation upon which further proceedings by way of
responsive pleadings and/or trial can go forward in
an orderly manner."
The pleading by Mr. Campbell as to mistake was:
"Said Agreement was VOID or VOIDABLE by reason that
there was a mutual mistake of fact between the plaintiff
and Lavell Brown, agent for State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, as to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff on
the 9th day of September, 1973. That the plaintiff in
fact suffered certain injuries to his neck and spine
and other areas of his body which were unknown to him
or LaVell Brown at the time said "Agreement and Release"
was signed."
Plaintiff claimed that he had a neck and spine injury
that was unknown to Lavell Brown, agent for State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company and himself as of September 21, 1973.
AS TO WHAT FACTS MAY BE REVIEWED:
The court may review the facts as to that portion of
the complaint asking a cancellation of the contract with State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company because the matter of
cancellation deals with equity.
"In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of
both law and fact." Constitution of Utah, Article 8,
Section 9.
This same provision is restated in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 72 and by the pronouncements of the court,
ie Ream v. Fitzen, filed June 13, 1978, Utah Supreme Court File

No. 15220.
- 27 -
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AS TO THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED TO CANCEL A CONTRACT BECAUSE
OF MISTAKE:
The degree of proof required to cancel a contract
because of mistake is different than the degree of proof in
the ordinary civil case.

Listed below are three Utah cases

which define the degree of proof required.
Evidence to sustain mutual mistake of fact must be
clear, definite and convincing and party asserting
it should not be guilty of negligence in execution
of contract. Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 374;
423 P.2d 657.
To prove such a mistake as will avoid the effects
of a written contract, evidence must be clear and
convincing. Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253
P. 2d 621.

•i
)

J

~
~
c

•

If there is no doubt that both parties contracted
in light of a belief that a certain situation or
condition was true and it is claimed by one party
that their belief was in fact a mistaken belief,
latter must prove by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that situation or condition in
reliance on which contract was made, was at time
of making thereof different from that which both
parties supposed or believed it to be. Kirch~estner
v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 118 Utah 41; 233 P. d 699.
AS TO THE PUBLIC POLICY FOR GIVING EFFECT TO CONTRACTS:
The general consideration of the law is to give effect
to the agreements contained in parties contracts.
has spoken on this subject on 'many occasions.

The Utah court'

Below are listed

cases outlining this general theory in our law.
In absence of compelling considerations of policy
- 28 -
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1

to contrary, it is duty of court to give effect
to covenants to which parties have agreed in their
contracts. Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America
17 Utah 2d 114; 405 P.2d 339.
'
People should be entitled to contract on their own
terms without indulgence of paternalism by courts
in alleviation of one side or another from the effects
of a bad bargain. Carlson v. Hamilton 8 Utah 2d 272·
332 P.2d 989.
'
'
Persons should be permitted to enter into contracts
that actually may be unreasonable or which may lead
to hardship on one side, and it is only where it
turns out that one side or the other is to be penalized by enforcement of the contract so unconscionable
that no fair-minded person would view the ensuing
result without a profound sense of injustice, that
equity will deny the use of its jurisdiction in enforcement of such unconscionability. Id.
It is not the function of the court to renegotiate
a contract of the parties. Id.
The purpose of contract is to reduce to writing the
conditions upon which the minds of the parties have
met and to fix their rights and duties in respect
thereto, and intent so expressed is to be found, if
possible, within the four corners of instrument itself in accordance with ordinary accepted meaning
of words used. E~hraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah
2d 163; 321 P.2d 21.
Even if a contract is ill advised and burdensome,
court cannot make a new contract for the parties.
Tooele Citl v. Settlement Canyon Irr. Co., 4 Utah
2d 215; 29 P.2d 881.
AS TO APPLYING THE ABOVE BASIC PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THIS

CASE:
Plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell, and LaVell Brown, agent
for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, negotiated
at length to reach an acceptable agreement because plaintiff was
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still under the doctor's care with his neck and back.

The

agreement called for substantial medical and wage loss benefits,
Each party to the contract kept a copy and Mr. Campbell had his
copy in his possession until December of 1973, when he took it
to his attorney, Jackson Howard.

See more complete statements

in this Brief, pages 4, 5, and 6.

Mr. Campbell, immediately after the accident in questk
went to the Carbon Hospital, where he gave a history of being
injured in an automobile accident, suffering pain in his neck
and having headaches.

Dr. Gorishek examined Mr. Campbell and

found spasm in the tissues of the neck, limitation of motion in
the neck in all directions, and radiographic evidence of acute
injury and chronic degeneration.
diagnosis of cervical sprain.

Dr. Gorishek reached the

Dr. Gorishek prescribed a muscle

relaxant and pain medication and advised Mr. Campbell to apply
heat to his neck.

Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on the

19th of September, 1973, and found his condition substantially
the same.

Dr. Gorishek knew that Mr. Campbell had an injury to

his neck, but the consequences of the injury turned out worse
than he originally thought.

See more complete statements in

this Brief, pages 8, 9, 10, and 11.
The evidence is to the effect that it was a soft
tissue injury and as stated by Dr. Gorishek, Tr-50, "the path·
ogenic condition of Mr. Campbell's neck was undoubtedly the
same September 9, 1973, as it was Decemb er 7 , 1973 " ·
- 30 -
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Pathogenic

being defined by Dr. Gorishek as, "the cause of the illness
or symptom".

Tr-51.

The evidence is overwhelming that Eugene P. Campbell
and LaVell Brown, at the time the document was executed were
well aware of the injury to Mr. Campbell's neck and spine.
After the meeting with Mr. Campbell, LaVell Brown wrote:
"Claimant is still under doctor's care with neck and
back so I negotiated an open release." Exhibit 29
Mr. Campbell, of course, stated in his original
history on the day of the accident that he was suffering from
pain in his neck.

Exhibit 39.

Tr-16.

Eugene P. Campbell

admitted on September 19, 1973, two days before the release was
executed, that he was having considerable pain and discomfort
in his neck.

Tr-143.

In fact, he took off a half day's work

on the 19th of September, 1973, to see Dr. Gorishek because he
was having difficulty.

Tr-144.

The contract itself contemplated further medical
expenses and loss of wages.
Eugene P. Campbell received an immediate cash settlement which was satisfactory when made and he further received a
very substantial written protection against the eventuality that
occurred.

Furthermore, Mr. Campbell availed himself of the con-

tractual benefits.
As said about Carrie M. Carter, in the case of Carter
v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005, there can be no question that after
the accident Mr. Campbell knew and was informed that he had an
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injury to his neck.

This is without a doubt a case in which

a release was given for a known neck injury, the future of
which was speculative.
The syllabus of Carter vs. Kingsford, heretofore
referred to, reads as follows:
1

"Where, at time of accident, diagnosis was "cervical
strain, strain of left shoulder and superficial abrasions," and it was indicated that X-rays and analysis,
indicated slight degenerative disc disease at C-5 a~
6 but at that time there was no reason for progn~~
of any necessary or possible surgical repair, and tlm:
plaintiff knew she had injury to her neck, her subse· I
quent troubles were "unknown consequences of a known
injury" which did not authorize avoidance of release."I
1

Defendant's contention is that Mr. Campbell's injury
fell clearly within the principle announced in the Carter vs.
Kingsford case.

The overwhelming evidence as to Mr. Campbell's

and Mr. Brown's knowledge of the neck injury is only strengthene:

1

by the form of the contract entered into between State Farm Muttl
Automobile Insurance Company and Eugene P. Campbell, which cont!i
plated further expense in connection with the injury.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF, EUGENE P. CAMPBELL, BY HIS CONDUCT AFTrn
SEPTEMBER 21, 1973, RATIFIED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND
STATE FARM MU11JAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
AS TO SIGNING CONTRACT:

I

I

0 n S ep t emb er 21 , 1973 , Lavell Brown, agent for State
Campbell
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company an d Eugene P ·
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met in Helper, Utah for the purpose of settling Mr. Campbell's
claim against Pearl Stagg.
Lavell Brown proposed the settlement of the entire
matter for a sum of either $1600 or $1800 on a release basis.
Tr-155, lines 12-25.
Mr. Campbell refused to settle on a complete release
because Mr. Campbell knew that he had an injury, but he did not
know the extent of his injury and he wanted to protect himself

'I

for future medical expenses and loss of wages.

'I

provision for medical expenses and loss of wages were important
to him at the time he signed the contract.

Tr-127-128.

The

Tr-158-159.

Mr. Campbell was given a copy of the contract after it
was signed on September 21, 1973.
AS TO MR. CAMPBELL'S INJURY:
u:

Up until December, 1973, Mr. Campbell's condition remained fairly static as he continued treatment under Dr. Gorishek.
For a more complete detail of the fact situation as to the medical
condition of Mr. Campbell, see his medical condition outlined in
this Brief, pages 8-14.
From December 19, 1973, to January 4, 1974, plaintiff
was in the St. Mark's Hospital being treated daily by several
doctors, Exhibit 40, the same being the hospital records for the
December, 1973, hospitalization.
AS TO ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT:
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The draft given to Mr. Campbell by Mr. Brown on
September 21, 1973, was sent for collection by Walker Bank
and Trust Company, Price, Utah, and not paid by The Greeley
National Bank, Greeley, Colorado, until October 1, 1973.
Exhibit 56.
Mr. Campbell continued to go to doctors in COIUlection
with his neck injury and ran up medical bills which he would
submit to the insurance company for payment under the provisions
of the contract.

Exhibits 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,

67, and 68.
Plaintiff continued to negotiate the drafts issued by
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company after the lawsuit
had been filed but before Pearl Stagg had been served.
AS TO APPLICABLE LAW:
If an injured person executes a contract of release,
which was sufficiently clear as to be understandable by a person
of ordinary intelligence, continues to have a copy of it in his
possession at all times, confers with bis lawyer in regard to the
contract and continues to receive benefits, he then as a matter
law ratifies the contract.

0'

See Wells v. Evans Products CompaEY,

446 P.2d 108.
The companion case of Wells v. Mix, 512 P.2d 788 (~ffil
reaffirms the rule as follows:
"Ratification of a release occurs when the releasor, .
with full knowledge of the facts entitling him to resci:,
. .
.
to a reasoni::
engages in unequivocal con d uct giving
rise
-
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inference that he intended the conduct to amount
to ratification."
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ERROR, HAS APPLIED UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, SECTION 78-27-44, ALLOWING INTEREST

ON SPECIAL DAMAGES RETROACTIVELY CONTRARY TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED ,
1953, SECTION 68-3-3, WHICH PROVIDES:

"NO PART OF THESE REVISED

STATUTES IS RETROACTIVE UNLESS EXPRESSLY SO DECLARED."
The trial court made a finding that interest on special
damages was due from the date of the injury, September 9, 1973,
until March 10, 1978, the same being $6,611.75, in accordance
with Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-27-44.

R-526.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-44
provides as follows:
"In all actions brought to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by any person, resulting from or
1
occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporatiort,
association or partnership, whether by negligence or
willful intent of that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and whether that injury shall
have resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be lawful
for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on
the special damages alleged from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action and
it shall be the duty of the court, in entering judgment
for plaintiff in that action, to add to the amount of
damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found
by the court, interest on that amount calculated at 8%
per annum from the date of the occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause ~f actio~ t~ the da~e of ent~r
ing the judgment, and to include it in that Judgment.
0

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-44,
became effective May 13, 1975.

See Laws of 1975, Chapter 97.

- 35 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 68-3-3, provides:
'~o part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared."

Three Utah cases have construed Utah law as requiring
prospective application of the statute rather than re t rospective
application.
A 1944 case, In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337;
148 P.2d 340; held:
"Legislative enactments operate prospectively rather
than retrospectively, unless expressly declared other·
wise."
A 1947 case, McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers

1

Retireme1

Board, 177 P.2d 725, discussed the problem as follows:
"Ordinarily legislative enactments are intended to
operate prospectively and not retrospectively. As
said in 50 Am. Jur. 494, Statutes, Section 478:
'The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, is one of legislative
intent.
In determining such intent, the courts have
evolved a strict rule of construction against a retro·
spective operation, and indulge in the presumption
that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments
thereof, enacted by it to operate prospectively only,
and not retroactively.
Indeed, the general rule is
that they are to be so construed, where they are sus·
ceptible of such interpretation and the intention of
the legislature can be satisfied thereby, where such
interpretation does not produce results which the
legislature may be presumed not to have intended, and
where the intention of the legislature to make the
statute retroactive is not stated in express terms.,or
clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally? un~1s:
takably, and unambiguously shown by necessary imptica
tion or terms which permit no other meaning to be aM~
ed to them preclude all question in regard thereto!'
leave no r~asonable doubt thereof.
~rdinarily? an
tention to give a statute a retroactive operationwit
not be inferred.
If it is doubtful whether the.statui
or amendment was intended to operate retrospect~ve~,
the doubt would be resolved against such operation.

:r;
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A 1958 case, Union Pacific Railroad Company v.
Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101; 329 P.2d 398; lays down the
rule as follows:
"As ~o any.statutory question, Utah's policy demands
the inclusion of any express authorization to justify
any retrospective application of a statute."
As a note to this rule, the court explains:
"Since 1898, in a number of compilations and revisions,
lastly in Title 68-3-3, U.C.A., 1953, it has been enacted that "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
The occurrence in the case at bar was September, 1973,
and the application of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
Section 78-27-44, allowing interest on special damages retroactively would be contrary to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section
68-3-3, which provides:
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared."
CONCLUSION
The contract between Eugene P. Campbell and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, containing the release of
Pearl Stagg, was plead as a bar to plaintiff's tort action, the
execution of the contract being admitted and plead by plaintiff.
The contract is a bar to plaintiff's action until it is rescinded.
To rescind a contract all parties interested in the
contract must be joined.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company, as the insurer of defendant, has an interest in and is
the contracting party of the contract that would have to be set
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aside and therefore, is an indispensable party.
The evidence demonstrates that there was no mutual
mistake of fact between plaintiff and LaVell Brown, agent for
the insurance company, as to the fact that plaintiff suffered
an injury to his neck and spine and therefore, as a matter of
law, defendant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment of
the lower court with a direction that the lower court enter a
judgment "no cause for action" against plaintiff.
Plaintiff, with full knowledge of his neck injury,
continued to receive the benefits of the contract by accepting
payment from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
until after the present action was filed and therefore, he

~s

ratified the contract between himself and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.
The trial court, in error, has applied Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-44, allowing interest
on special damages retroactively contrary to Utah Code Annotated,
1953, Section 68-3-3, which provides:

"No part of these revised

statutes is retroactive unless expressly so declared."
Respectfully submitted this (}(pZ( day of July, 1978.
--

---------

Defendant and
Appellant.
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